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In this article, we highlight three questions: (1) Does human 
cognition rely on structured internal representations? (2) How 
should theories, models and data relate? (3) In what ways might 
embodiment, action and dynamics matter for understanding the 
mind and the brain? 
 
The first question concerns a fundamental assumption of most 
researchers who theorize about the brain.  Do neural systems 
exploit classical compositional and systematic representations, 
distributed representations, or no representations at all? The 
question is not easily answered.  Connectionism, for example, has 
been criticised for both holding and challenging representational 
views.  The second quesútion concerns the crucial methodological 
issue of how results emerging from the various brain sciences can 
help to constrain cognitive scientific models. Finally, the third 
question focuses attention on a major challenge to contemporary 
cognitive science: the challenge of understanding the mind as a 
controller of embodied and environmentally embedded action.  
 
Does cognition need representations? 
 
 “Does cognition need representations” is the most difficult and 
least well defined of our three questions.  But it addresses one of 
the most philosophically interesting features of many connectionist 
models, especially those most closely related to brain theory.  The 
intuúition is that connectionism poses a challenge to the classical 
view of the brain as a syntax-sensitive engine. This idea involves 
depicting all or most of human cognition as involving something 
akin to logical operations apúplied to something akin to linguistic 
(sentential) structures.  The prime philosophical exponent of the 
identification of genuine cognitive processes with such operations 
on quasi-sentential entities is Fodor (see Fodor, 1987; Fodor and 
Pylyshyn, 1988).  Fodor argues in favor of an innate symbolic code 
(the Lanúguage of Thought) and of mental processes as involving 
operaútions defined over the syntactically structured strings of that 
code.  The underlying image is of an inner economy in which 
symbol strings are operated on by procedures sensitive to the 
structure of the string. 
 
In contrast, a typical trained-up network, does not employ 
grammatical strings nor, a fortiori, processing operations sensitive 
to the structure of such strings.  Instead, we find prototypical 
complexes of properties represented in a high-dimensional space 
(see P.M. Churchland 1995). The space is highly organized in the 
sense that data items which need to be treated in closely related 
ways become encoded in neighboring regions of the space.  It is 
this semantic metric which allows the network to generalize and to 
respond well under conditions of noise, etc.  But this organization 
of the encoded knowledge does not amount to the provision of a 
genuine syntax.  One way to see this difference is to ask what rules 
of combination of represented elements apúply, and in what 
systematic ways we can operate on complexes of represented 
items.  As Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) point out, there is no analog 
in distributed representations to the logical operations of detaching 
an element from one string (complex representation) and adding it 
to another. 
 
Nevertheless, a variety of connectionist techniques have been 
developed to allow for structure-sensitive processing, but such 
techniques have been deúscribed (van Gelder, 1990) as providing 
functional, as opposed to concatenative, compositional structure.  
A complex represenútation has concatenative structure if it embeds 
the individual constitutive elements unaltered within it.  It has 
functional comúpositional structure if such components are usable 
or retrievúable, but the complex expression does not itself embed 
unalútered tokens of these parts.  Most connectionist schemes for 
dealing with compositional structure are functionally 
compositional (e.g., RAAM architectures, tensor product 
enúcodings, holographic reduced representations (HRRs); although 
synchrony binding is concatenative. For a review, see 
CONNECTIONIST AND SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATIONS). 
Of these, HRRs are perhaps best suited to bridging the traditional 
gap between connectionist and symbolicist approaches to 
understanding language-like processing. HRRs are supremely 
structure sensitive, do not suffer from the dimensional increases of 
tensor products, and can be implemented in standard connectionist 
networks, yet they are not concatenative (Eliasmith and Thagard, 
2001).  
 
In our opinion, a major benefit of exploring the space of 
connectionist cogúnitive models is thus that it may help us expand 
our sense of the possible nature of internal representation and 
hence better understand what is truly essential to notions such as 
structure, synútax, and complex representation.  Doing so, we may 
discover which aspects of our models are simply artifacts of our 
(over)familúiarity with one representational format, viz., the 
format of atomic elements and grammar common to language and 
logic.  
 
How do theories, models and data relate? 
 
As a computational formalism connectionism is quite powerful, 
allowing us to approximate nearly any function or performance 
profile that we desire. However, the mere fact that some input-
output pattern P is found in human cognition and can be mimicked 
using some connectionist model is, in itself, of only marginal 
psychological interest. The demands of cognitive science, unlike 
those of artificial intelligence, require more.  Ideally, we must 
provide models which are both consistent with neurological data 
and comprehensible.  However, the relation between data and 
models is not uni-directional.  Models are constrained by data, but 
they also help us determine what sorts of experiments to use in 
looking for more relevant details.  The role of theories in unifying 
the brain sciences and connectionism is an important, albeit (for 
the time being) a mysterious, one (although see Eliasmith and 
Anderson, in press, chp. 1 for one possibility). 
 
The data which constrain models comes largely from two sources: 
higher levels, from work in disciplines such as psychology and 
psycholinguistics, and lower levels, from work in neuroscience and 
brain theory.  From psychology and psycholinguistics we can 
extract vast bodies of constraining data which go way beyond the 
mere specification of a task-specific input-output mapping.  Such 
data can concern, for example, the relative difúficulty of parsing 
certain sentences or solving certain problems, the time course of 
problem solving, the developmental profile of skill acquisition, and 
the way in which new and old knowlúedge interacts in the context 
of new learning (for detailed exúamples, see Karmiloff-Smith, 
1992; DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS). 
 
For current purposes, however, it is the lower level constraints 
which we seek to highlight.  The question here concerns the 
propúer relation between connectionist computational modeling 
and the detailed constraints emerging from the various brain 
sciúences.  Such sciences include neuroanatomy, neurochemistry, 
lesion studies, and research on the single cell, circuit, and sysútems 
level.  It seems clear that any acceptable model of human 
information processing must respect the results of such studies.  To 
do so, some intelligible relation must exist between the theories put 
forward by, for example, connectionist computaútional modeling 
and the entities and lawful interactions studied by the brain 
sciences.  It is a duty sadly neglected by both classical artificial 
intelligence and a great deal of connectionist work to make some 
effort to display the precise nature of such relations. 
 
Such a task is complicated by the variety of levels of interest which 
may characterize the brain sciences.  These include the levels of 
biochemical specification: single cells, circuits, subsysútems, and 
networks of subsystems.  Marr’s suggestion that studies at each 
level can be independently pursued is highly dubious.  Our top-
level decomposition of a task into subtasks apt for computational 
modeling may be challenged once we become familiar with the 
distribution of information processing resources in the brain.  What 
we originally thought of as two distinct functions may actually 
share circuitry in the brain (see Arbib, 1998).  Such a result will 
not be devoid of psychological significance, since it will figure in 
an explanation of the breakdown profile as reúvealed by, for 
example, lesion studies of the system. 
 
How, then, should we conceive the bridge between idealized 
artificial intelligence models and brain theory?   It is precisely the 
complex relations between implementation and function that have 
spawned a recent surge of interest in computational neuroscience.  
With the explicit goal of taking biological constraints as seriously 
as computational ones, computational neuroscience has begun to 
explore a vast range of realistic neural models.  For example, 
Reike et al. (1997) provide an information theoretic analysis of 
spike trains, allowing accurate stimulus signal reconstruction.  The 
combination of such spike train analyses and, for example, 
Abbott’s (1994) higher-level discussions of basis function 
representations, can provide valuable insights into the functioning 
of populations of neurons  (see Eliasmith and Anderson, in press).  
Though preliminary, the tools developed by such research are 
promising candidates for generating biologically realistic 
connectionist models. 
 
Such models should prove useful in providing constraints of their 
own.  Insights from basis function analyses suggest new 
experiments for neurophysiologists.  In particular, it seems that 
neurons may have higher-dimensional tuning profiles than 
previously imagined.  Though neurological techniques for 
determining complex profiles have yet to be perfected, 
connectionist modeling suggests such tuning properties are 
important to the everyday functioning of neurons.  So, not only 
does biology inform the construction of computational models but, 
ideally, those same models can help suggest important experiments 
for neuroscientists to perform.  In this sense, models and data can 
be mutually beneficial.  Of course, the benefits are highly 
constrained by assumptions of both the model and experimental 
design. 
 
Although no model can be expected to do justice to all aspects of 
its target, what justice it can do depends on the biological realism 
of the assumptions behind the model.  Biological realism, of 
course, can be incorporated into a model in many ways; e.g., by 
including neurochemical diffusion, single neuron morphology, 
spike train statistics, neuroanatomical constriants, population 
dynamics, or system-level organization (see Eliasmith and 
Anderson, in press, for examples).  In any case, what we can and 
should expect from a modeler is a clear statement of what aspects 
of the target phenomenon are supposed to be explained, and (if it is 
a computational model) at what level the computational story is 
intended to capture real neurophysiological facts. Successful 
attempts to exploit the close relation between experiment and 
model are still something of a rareity. This is largely because 
theoreticians (typically mathematicians, physicists and engineers) 
and experimentalists (typically neuroscientists and biologists) do 
not yet have many conceptual tools in common. In order to reap 
the benefits of mutual, inter-level constraint, this will likely have to 
be rectified. 
 
In what ways might embodiment matter for understanding 
the mind and the brain?
 
In recent years, an important challenge has been issued to 
cognitive science.  It stems from the work of researchers espousing 
the dynamicist hypothesis (van Gelder, 1995). The dynamicist 
commitment to making time central to cognitive modeling is 
inspired by the broader realization that cognitive systems are real 
physical systems acting in the real world in real time.  Given the 
finite, though vast, computational resources of the brain, it also 
seems that evolution has often off-loaded complex computational 
tasks to the body and to the environment.  This double 
‘situatedness’ of cognitive systems needs to be reckoned with if we 
are to develop an accurate picture of precisely the kinds of 
computation neural systems perform.  Connectionism and brain 
theory must conspire to explain this kind of representational and 
computational economy.  Thus, while looking inside  to the brain 
and the results of neuroscience we can not afford to turn a blind 
eye to constraints and resources which come from the outside, the 
gross body and environment of a cognitive system (Clark 1997). 
 
Consider vision.  There is now a growing body of work devoted to 
so-called ‘Animate’ vision (Ballard 1991).  The key insight here is 
that the task of vision is not to build rich inner models of a 
surrounding 3D reality, but rather to use visual information 
efficiently and cheaply in the service of real-world, real-time 
action.  Animate vision thus rejects Marr’s analysis, what 
Churchland et al. nicely dub the paradigm of “pure vision” – the 
idea (associated with work in classical AI and in the use of vision 
for planning), that vision is largely a means of creating a world 
model rich enough to let us “throw the world away’,  targeting 
reason and thought upon the inner model instead.  Real-world 
action, in these ‘pure vision’ paradigms, functions merely as a 
means of implementing solutions arrived at by pure cognition. 
 
The Animate vision paradigm, by contrast, gives action a starring 
role.  Computational economy and temporal efficiency is 
purchased by a variety of bodily action and local environment 
exploiting tricks and ploys including 
 
〈       the use of cheap, easy-to-detect (possibly idiosyncratic) 
environmental cues (e.g., Searching for Kodak film in a drug 
store? Seek ‘Kodak yellow’.); 
 
〈       the use of active sensing (e.g., use motor action, guided by 
rough perceptual analysis, to seek further inputs yielding better 
perceptual data – move head and eyes for better depth perception, 
etc.); and 
 
〈       the use of repeated consultations of the world in place of rich, 
detailed inner models. 
 
Ballard et al. (1997) have recently demonstrated that  subjects do 
not bind color and location information in a block-copying task 
until it is absolutely required by current problem-solving.  As a 
result, changes made to the display (such as switching the color of 
blocks during a saccade) are very often undetected. 
 
Vision, this body of work suggests, is a highly active and 
intelligent process.  It is not the passive creation of a rich inner 
model, so much as the active retrieval (typically by moving the 
high resolution fovea in a saccade) of useful information as it is 
needed from the constantly present real-world scene.  Ballard et al. 
speak of “just-in-time representation”, while the roboticist, Rodney 
Brooks, has coined the slogan “The world is its own best model” 
(Brooks 1991).  The combined moral is clear: vision makes the 
most of the persisting external scene, and gears its computational 
activity closely and sparingly to the task at hand. 
 
The general thrust of the Animate vision research program, 
however, is not to reject the ideas of internal models and 
representations, so much as to reconfigure them in a sparser and 
more interactive image. We thus read of inner databases that 
associate objects (e.g., my car keys) and locations (on the kitchen 
table), of internal feature representations, of indexical 
representations and so on. What is being rejected is not the notion 
of inner content-bearing states per se, but only the much stronger 
notion of rich, memory-intensive, all-purpose forms of internal 
representation. 
 
The crucial distinction, it seems to us, is thus not between 
representational and non-representational solutions so much as 
between rich and action-neutral forms of internal representation 
(which may increase flexibility but require additional 
computational work to specify a behavioral response) and sparse 
and action-oriented forms (which exploit the body and world and 




Our vision of basic biological reason is rapidly changing. There is 
a growing emphasis on the computational economies afforded by 
real-world action and our growing appreciation of the way larger 
structures (of agent and artifacts) both scaffold and transform the 
shape of individual reason. These twin forces converge on a rather 
more minimalist account of individual cognitive processing – an 
account that tends to eschew rich, all-purpose internal models and 
sentential forms of internal representations. Such minimalism, 
however, has its limits. Despite some ambitious arguments, there is 
currently no reason to doubt the guiding vision of individual agents 
as loci of internal representations and users of a variety of inner 
models. Rather than opposing representationalism against 
interactive dynamics, we should be embracing a broader vision of 
the inner representational resources themselves. 
 
The sciences of the mind are thus in a state of productive flux: the 
product of multiple converging influences coming from real-world 
robotics, systems-level neuroscience, cognitive psychology, 
evolutionary theory, Artificial Intelligence, and philosophical 
analysis.  This flux has forced us to reconsider earlier accounts of 
the relation between thoery, models, and data relevant to cognitive 
systems. More importantly, we can see a new vision of mind 
emerging. The point at which many of these influences currently 
converge is captured by seeing mind as in essence a controller of 
embodied and environmentally-embedded action. Mind is an organ 
for orchestrating real-time responses to a real world.  
 
One major player in these recent events has been the explosion of 
work on Artificial Neural Networks.  Such networks amounted to 
an existence proof of the possibility of adaptive intelligent 
behavior without reliance on explicitly formulated rules or 
language-like data-structures. Moreover, the networks integrated 
representation and action in a very direct manner:  knowledge 
became encoded in a form dictated by its use in a particular type of 
problem solving.  But the Neural Networks revolution was 
incomplete.  It was incomplete because it was still burdened with 
much of the unnecessary baggage of the previous, disembodied, 
symbol-crunching approach to understanding cognition.  Mind was 
still treated as an essentially timeless locus of abstract problem-
solving capacities. 
 
All this changed with the  surge of interest (in the late 80's, early 
90's) in what became known as Autonomous Agent research (see 
e.g., essays in Beer, Ritzmann and McKenna (1993)).  This 
research aimed to model and understand the adaptive success of 
single, complete, embodied systems: insects which walk and seek 
food, the cockroach's amazingly sophisticated mechanisms for 
detecting and evading attackers, robots which learn to swing from 
branch to branch using real mechanical arms, etc., etc.. Many of 
these models exploit Artificial Neural Networks as control 
systems.  But the constraints on success became very different. 
 
Finally, the constraints on computation using Artificial Neural 
Networks are very different from those on real biological 
computation. It is here that the relation between theory, model, and 
data again becomes pivotal. Interestingly, reconceptualizing mind 
in each of these previous cases has depended on rethinking the 
relevant constraints (i.e., linguistic vs. non-linguistic symbols, 
partial vs. full-bodied systems). Introducing the complexities of 
natural neural computation is bound to have a similar impact on 
our concept of mind.  
 
So, many important questions remain. Can work in artificial neural 
networks come to grips with the real complexity of biological 
computation? What kinds of systems-level model can help make 
sense of the complex balance between specialization and co-
operation that we find in real brains? Can a representation-sparse 
approach make headway with all aspects of human cognition, or is 
it limited to cases of perceptuo-motor control and on-line 
reasoning? How does the command of public language impact and 
transform human thought and reason? 
 
The cognitive science of the biological, embodied mind is still in 
its infancy, and the full power and scope of the new vision remain 
to be determined.  But the issues raised will, we believe, shape the 
agenda of the next decade of research into mind and its place in 
nature. 
 
Road Map: Connectionist Psychology 
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